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concept embodying a multitude of meanings. The Ivorian parties have framed their civil war as the result
of a conflict between several meanings of resistance. The presidential party claims to lead a nationalist
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particularly of the roadmap to peace adopted at Linas- Marcoussis, France, and later endorsed by the
United Nations and other international actors as the appropriate framework for a peaceful and durable
solution to the crisis. By presenting a set of principles and operational measures for an alternative conflict
resolution strategy this article is focused on the creation of sustainable democratic institutions and their
legitimization through a truly democratic process for writing and adopting a new Ivorian constitution.
Whether or not in a post-9/11 world, conflicts such as those in the Cote d’Ivoire continue to be
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COTE D'IVOIRE NEEDS A NEW CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND PEACEBUILDING STRATEGY

Essoh J.M. C. Essis

Abstract

The military and political crisis in Cote d'Ivoire is an illustration of the assertion
that resistance is a concept embodying a multitude of meanings. The Ivorian parties
have framed their civil war as the result of a confhct between several meanings of
resistance. The presidential party claims to lead a nationalist resistance against
neocolonial forces associated with the French government, as well as a Christian
resistance against Islamic terrorism. The armed rebellion and the traditional
political opposition contend that their actions are justified by a duty of resistance
against ethnic and religious sectarianism, as well as Mr. Gbagbo 's despotic and
unprincipled style ofgovernment.
This article provides a critical analysis of current international efforts to resolve the
Ivorian conflict, and particularly of the roadmap to peace adopted at LinasMarcoussis, France, and later endorsed by the United Nations and other
international actors as the appropriate framework for a peaceful and durable
solution to the crisis. By presenting a set ofprinciples and operational measures for
an alternative conflict resolution strategy this article is focused on the creation of
sustainable democratic institutions and their legitimization through a truly
democratic process for writing and adopting a new Ivorian constitution. Whether or
not in a post-9/11 world, conflicts such as those in the Cote d'Ivoire continue to be
ignominiously ignored and marginalized by the United States is yet to be seen, but
what this article proves is a need to establish a viable solution of lasting-peace for
the region.
Introduction

The three-year old military and political cns1s in Cote d'Ivoire is a
compelling example of the assertion that resistance is "a transformative concept
embodying a multitude of meanings, which is [claimed] by different social and
political actors. " 1 Intrastate (or "ethnic") conflicts in Africa are generally viewed as
predictable results of the economic and political deficiencies that are common to
weak, fragile and/or failed states (Mentan, 2004, Osaghae, 2001; Osaghae, 2004,
Mbaku et al., 2001) or, conversely, as one of the major causes of state failure
(Ejobowah, 2001, Okumu, 2001, Udogu, 2001). However, as Vaughan (2001)
suggests, ethnic structures and themes have sometimes emerged as "agents of
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grassroots resistance to repressive regimes" (p. 94) and may well, as such, constitute
positive forces for democratic progress and social and political development.
The Ivorian parties themselves have constantly and consistently framed
their conflict as the opposition of several, contradictory yet complementary, visions
of resistance. On one side of the conflict, prominent members of the president's
party have claimed that their struggle is one of resistance against the neocolonialist
politics and policies of France toward their country, but also of resistance against
Islamist terrorists seeking to invade and conquer a prosperous country that has
always been "loved and blessed by [the Christian] God". On the other side, the
leaders of the Forces Nouvelles movement have justified their own struggle as one
of resistance against religious and ethnic sectarianism as characterized by the
exclusionist policies directed against Northerners-and-Muslims by three Southernerand-Christian-led governments. Between these two extremes, the strategic
partnership formed by the political opposition parties and the political branch of the
rebellion claims that its actions are motivated by a duty of resistance against Mr.
Gbagbo's despotic and unprincipled style of government.
Armed with their respective story of resistance and oblivious of the
difficulties involved in asking the Bush administration to choose between its war
against terror and its war against tyranny in this specific case, these Ivorian parties
have spent considerable amounts of money and energy to lobby religious and
political activist groups in the United States. To date, neither side has been
successful in gaining the support of the US government for its cause, as
Washington's position is one of detached neutrality which is rooted in the belief that
there is no significant US interest in intervening in a little known country that is part
of France's exclusive zone of influence in Africa.
In the meantime, there has been no improvement in the situation of the
ground in spite more or less direct interventions from large sections of the
international community, including: the 15 other West African nations, ECOW AS,
the African Union, South Africa, France, Organisation Internationale de la
Francophonie, the United Kingdom, the European Union, the United Nations, the
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Moreover, there is a high
probability of catastrophic escalation after the expiration of the president's term in
office on October 30, 2005, with the recognition by all the parties involved that it is
impossible to organize the constitutionally mandated elections for his replacement
on that date.
On October 6, 2005, the 40 th Summit of the African Union (AU) Peace and
Security Council (PSC)2, announced a series of decisions intended to avoid such a
development. In substance, the Council reaffirms that the Linas-Marcoussis
agreement, as revised subsequently by the Accra III and Pretoria agreements,
constitutes the appropriate framework for a "peaceful and lasting solution to the
Ivorian crisis", and that these arrangements must continue beyond October 30,
2005, but "for a period not exceeding 12 months". The Council further decides that
President Gbagbo must remain Head of State during this period, and that he must
appoint "a new Prime Minister acceptable to all parties and signatories as per the
Linas-Marcoussis Agreement". A new government, composed of personalities
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proposed by the Ivorian parties who are signatories to the LM Agreement, will be
formed to continue discharging the responsibilities and tasks assigned to it by the
said agreements. 3 These decisions were immediately rejected by the leadership of
the Forces Nouvelles while their rationality and practical effectiveness were
seriously questioned by the political opposition represented by the Rassemblement
des Houphouetistes pour la Paix et le Development and other important political and
civil groups.
More than anything, the PCS decisions reflect the incapacity or
unwillingness of the major mediating parties to think beyond the Linas-Marcoussis
(LM) agreement in order to adopt the innovative solutions that are required to
manage and eventually resolve the Ivorian crisis. Since its conclusion in January
2003, the LM agreement has "been mired by disagreement and dodged by delays.',4
It is noteworthy that the PSC decision does not include a deadline for appointment
of the new Prime Minister or for the formation of the new government, or even new
dates for the constitutionally mandated presidential, legislative and municipal
elections (normally due on October 25, 2005, December 12, 2005, and March 25,
2006 respectively). But even if these serious lacunae were repaired, it is hard to
imagine how prolonging the game with basically the same actors for another year
would yield the results that they have been unable to produce during the last three
years.
This paper was written in December 2004 as a working paper and thinking
piece for an international policy meeting on Cote d'Ivoire. It provides a critical
analysis of the Linas-Marcoussis agreements based on insider's knowledge of the
constitutional, legal and political history of the country, as well as of the underlying
cultural and social factors of the conflict. It also presents a set of principles and
operational measures for an alternative conflict resolution strategy which focuses on
the creation of sustainable democratic institutions and their legitimization through a
truly democratic process for writing and adopting a new Ivorian constitution.

Why the Linas-Marcoussis plan is ineffective
The LM arrangements are ineffective and inapplicable by the Ivorian parties
because the two fundamental assumptions on which Jheir legitimacy was
constructed have now been proven wrong. In addition, the agreement itself is based
on a set of fundamentally flawed decisions regarding the process, objective(s) and
methods required for resolving this specific conflict.

Wrong assumptions about the parties
The first assumption on which the LM agreement rests is that the Cote
d'Ivoire crisis is a strictly internal affair and that only the Ivorian parties are parts of
the problem and responsible for its solution.5 The events of the last two years have
shown that several external actors were directly involved in the emergence of the
conflict and have significant interests in its dynamics and possible outcomes. These
include 15 West African states and/or governments.6 Some of these states may be
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simply seeking to preserve their own economic, political and military stability,
either because significantly large numbers of their citizens or natives reside in Cote
d'Ivoire, or because they suffered from Ivorian domestic and foreign policy
initiatives within the last 2-4 decades. In fact, no West African government or
intergovernmental institution can be seriously considered a neutral and impartial
actor in this conflict, given the central political and economic role of CI in the
region.
The second assumption is that France can be an impartial mediator and
peacekeeper in the Ivorian conflict. In fact, France appears quite clearly now as the
single most important non-neutral, non-Ivorian and non-African party to the Ivorian
conflict. Beside the need to protect their citizens residing in Cote d'Ivoire, French
governments are often closely linked to powerful French corporations which have
effectively controlled the economic and political systems of Cote d'Ivoire and other
former French West African colonies for the last 40 years. 7
It is noteworthy that many leaders of President Gbagbo's political party (the
Front Populaire Ivoirien) have consistently rejected the idea that France is a nonneutral party to the Ivorian conflict. They have argued, from the start of the crisis,
that the September 2002 Coup attempt and the subsequent partition of CI is nothing
more than a "colonialist war" masterminded and conducted by President Chirac's
government and powerful French corporations to replace a "democratic regime"
with their "old-time friends and allies of the 'Frans;afrique' networks."
According to the proponents of this thesis, the rebellion is part of a covert
operation financed by the large French corporations which control important sectors
of the lvorian economy against the adoption of free-market/open-competition rules
and practices by the FPI regime to improve the management of the Ivorian state and
economy. Proponents of this view also contend that Mr. Chirac and/or his UMP
party have some well-established ideological, business and/or personal ties with Mr.
Ouattara and Mr. Bedie who are both responsible for numerous acts of political
violence (involving military and police forces) and judicial persecution against Mr.
Gbagbo and his followers between 1993 and 1999. 8
·
Furthermore, in spite of the formal expression of support for the presence
and actions of French troops in Cote d'Ivoire by the UN Security Council, several
African states and major intergovernmental organizations, the applicability of the
LM roadmap and the political legitimacy of future French initiatives in the
resolution of the Jvorian conflict have been significantly undermined by the
incidents of 7 November 2004 in which French helicopters and sharpshooters
opened fire on Ivorian civilian demonstrators near the presidential palace in
Abidjan-Cocody. Many observers, including various French media organizations
such as "Le Monde" now believe that France can no longer be realistically regarded
as an impartial peace-broker but rather as a non-neutral party to the conflict.
In light of the above, it would be preferable that any official role assigned to
France in a new peacekeeping and conflict resolution strategy be as limited as
possible because the French government has both strong incentives and unparalleled
capabilities to influence the dynamics and outcomes of the Ivorian conflict in order
to serve its own national interest objectives, however these objectives may be
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defined.

..

Wrong decisions relative to process, objectives and methods
The LM roadmap is inapplicable and is no longer relevant because the
evolution of the situation on the ground has exposed serious problems with its
objectives, methods and processes.
Process
The LM roadmap suggests that adoption of the constitutional and legal
reforms agreed by the parties should be a condition for disarmament of the armed
forces on both sides. This was, perhaps, the only deal possible under the conditions
which prevailed in January 2003. However, the destruction of the Ivorian Air Force
fleet by France's Licome Force on 7 November 2004 and the institution of an
immediate arms embargo by UN resolution 1572 have combined to create a new
political situation where it is both possible and desirable to tum the logic behind this
deal on its head. To the extent that the situation on the ground has not changed
significantly since the end of 2004, a new conflict resolution plan for Cote d'Ivoire
should insist particularly that disarmament of all the Ivorian parties is the sine qua
non and first step of any intervention by international actors.
Objectives
One of the main components and major objectives of the LM roadmap is
the holding of free, fair and inclusive elections starting in October 2005. While this
objective was reasonably appealing in January 2003, it is now evident, nearly two
years later and with only 11 more months remaining before that date, that the
political, administrative and psychological conditions for holding these elections
have not been met by the parties.
According to an Agence France Press report, President Abdoulaye Wade of
Senegal is circulating a new peace plan for CI which proposes the postponement of
the 2005 elections. 9 Once the necessity to postpone the 2005 elections is recognized,
the need for a new roadmap becomes evident since the LM agreement contains no
prescriptions as to when to organize elections after 2005 and, more importantly,
what to do between now and the new dates for holding these elections.
Method
In addition to the wrong decisions exposed above, the most important
obstacles to the implementation of the LM roadmap were inadvertently created by
the French mediators and architects of the LM roadmap because they misunderstood
or simply overlooked two key questions regarding: (i) the real, least understood yet
fundamental cause of the Ivorian conflict; and (ii) the type of constitutional process
required for its successful resolution.
The Ivorian constitution should be changed, not just amended
After listening to the arguments and pretensions of the warring parties, the
French mediators rightly concluded that the exclusionist, "anti-foreigner",
provisions written in the Ivorian constitution of August 2000 were the main points
of contention. Therefore, they recommended that these provisions be amended
because they wrongly believed that the only or best way to "fix" a legal text (here
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the constitution) which contains "bad" provisions is to replace these with "good"
provisions through a (constitutional) amendment.
A more careful analysis of the conflict reveals that the LM mediators failed
to identify its most important underlying cause and, consequently, the key for its
resolution. They simply did not understand that the real problem with the current
lvorian constitution lies not in the iniquity of its provisions, but rather in that of the
process through which it was elaborated and enacted. The constitution of August
2000 was indeed elaborated then enacted through an autocratic process dictated and
implemented by a decadent military regime. 10 It is the nature of this constitutional
process that made possible the inclusion of the exclusionist provisions denounced
by the rebel movement and its political allies.
Once it is understood that the constitutional provisions regarded as unjust
by one or more of the parties did not impose themselves but were produced as the
result of an illegitimate and undemocratic constitutional elaboration process, it
becomes clear that the proper way to resolve the Ivorian conflict is not to amend
these provisions (as the LM roadmap requests that the Ivorian parties do) but rather
to take the legitimate steps required to endow the country with a new constitution
that is both democratically elaborated and democratically enacted. The main
challenge raised by the new conflict resolution strategy suggested in this paper is,
therefore, that of providing Cote d'Ivoire with a democratic constitution, that is, one
which is elaborated and enacted through a transparent, fair and appropriately
inclusive democratic process.
"Parallelisme des formes" and constitutional amendment process in CI
What can be regarded as the most lethal flaw of the LM agreements is that,
during the LM negotiations, the French mediators led the lvorian parties to agree on
the necessity to amend certain provisions of the Ivorian constitution of August 2000
but paid little attention to the simple truism that a constitution cannot legitimately
be amended in violation of its own formal rules and processes relative to such
amendments. In so doing, they inadvertently violated a fundamental legal principle
known as "parallelisme des form es."
The phrase "parallelisme des formes" (which can be translated in English as
"formal (or jurisdictional) symmetry") refers to an important principle in the French
civil law system which roughly prescribes that only the administrative authority
which takes a given legal action according to a certain procedure is competent to
take a contrary action according to the same procedure. As a general rule
applicable to legal reform processes in all civil law systems, the "parallelisme des
formes" principle applies automatically to the constitutional amendment process in
Ivorian law. How such a basic legal principle was ignored during the LM roundtable
is difficult to understand when one considers that Mr. Pierre Mazeaud, the French
mediator and Chairman of the roundtable, is an eminent professor of constitutional
law.
It is noteworthy that, after they reluctantly accepted the provisions of the
LM agreement prescribing amendments to the constitution in order to enable former
Prime Minister Ouattara to run in the 2005 presidential election, the strategists in
Mr. Gbagbo' s camp quickly understood that organization of a referendum on this
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question was absolutely not feasible in a partitioned and bitterly divided country.
Therefore, they decided to invoke the "parallelisme des formes" principle and
argued, rather correctly, that the constitution of August 2000 was formally adopted
by referendum and that no solution other than the organization of another
referendum could legally validate the amendments agreed to in LM. Since then,
significant disagreements over the necessity of a referendum have resulted in the
deadlock and paralysis of the LM roadmap.
It is both necessary and urgent for the international community to admit that
the roadmap established by the Linas-Marcoussis/Kleber arrangements and
confirmed by the Accra III meeting is inapplicable, and for the United Nations and
other concerned international actors to identify, adopt, promote and implement a
new peacekeeping and conflict resolution strategy in Cote d'Ivoire.

Resolution 1572 and the political legitimacy of sanctions
The adoption of Resolution 1572, which establishes an arms embargo on
Cote d'Ivoire (and authorizes the use of force to enforce the said embargo, under
chapter 7 of the UN Charter), constitute an important positive step toward the deescalation and eventually the resolution of the conflict.
In a statement made to Radio France Internationale on 16 November 2004,
the head of the Cote d'Ivoire Mission to the United Nations called Resolution 1572
"an injustice against [Cote d'Ivoire because] ... Everything was done on the basis of
the arguments presented by . France, although it is a non-neutral party to the
conflict." 11
·
Similar views have been expressed by some African observers. However,
there is no evidence to date that the new UN resolution creates a negative political
climate for UN peacekeeping efforts in Cote d'Ivoire. In fact, Mr. Gbagbo himself
has stated (in his typical double-meaning rhetorical style) that he welcomes the
resolution because it already initiates, and will effectively contribute to, the
disarmament of the FN as well as the FANCI. 12
Unfortunately, at a time when the political legitimacy and the likely
effectiveness of the existing roadmap have been seriously undermined, the text of
the resolution contains no indication that the UNSC is willing and able to move
beyond the LM/Accra framework in order to adopt a new peacekeeping and conflict
resolution strategy.
The adoption of the new resolution does not in itself suggest (nor does it
confirm) the failure of the LM roadmap. However, it clearly shows that the
piecemeal, "reactive" and "hands-off' approach adopted by the UN since the
beginning of the Ivorian conflict cannot be effective. In fact, the recent escalation of
the conflict is a direct and predictable result of the UN' s failure to back up the LM
roadmap fully and in a timely manner.
Once the LM agreement was endorsed by the SC, it was crucial for the UN
to "show some teeth" ( or to display "the big stick behind the carrot") in order to
ensure that the roadmap is respected by all the I vorian parties and their respective
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(internal and external) allies. In fact, the UN failed to do so because it did not have a
clear peacekeeping and conflict resolution strategy of its own when it gave its
support to the French brokered peace agreement and, quite reluctantly, moved to
deploy its own peace-keeping forces on the ground.
The best way to correct these mistakes and to avoid repeating them in the
future is for the UN to replace the French-brokered peace agreement with a new,
more comprehensive conflict resolution strategy, and to assume a stronger, more
direct leadership role in the management of the Ivorian conflict. To be effective, the
new conflict resolution strategy proposed here requires the adoption by the UN
leadership of a direct intervention style based on the following three principles:
Demand, Command and Control. In order to succeed, it must demonstrate a firm
commitment on the part of the international community to peaceful conflict
resolution and national reconciliation in Cote d'Ivoire; identify existing Ivorian
institutions that are favorable to these objectives, or create new ones as required;
then empower these institutions to implement a programme of specific actions
under a strict and effective control of the UN Secretariat General.
Major international actors and their respective roles

After more than 2 years of political and military deadlock punctuated by
episodic outbreaks of violence, the Ivorian belligerent parties have shown
significant limitations in their capacity to win militarily. In fact, they have become
significantly weaker than at the beginning of the conflict and now seem willing to
move toward a political solution that can enable both parties to save face and lead to
the institutional reforms that are required for achieving genuine national
reconciliation in a reunified country.
At this juncture however, the reluctance of the UN and the international
community to commit the political/diplomatic, financial and moral/psychological
resources required for successful implementation of such a solution may well
encourage desperate moves of the kind made by the FANCI on 4-6 November 2004.
Such acts could durably escalate the conflict and risk expanding it to neighboring
countries such as Burkina Faso, Liberia, Guinea, and even Mali.
The major international actors whose involvement could significantly
increase the political legitimacy and the odds of success of the new UN strategy
proposed here are the United States, the European Union and South Africa.
The United States is arguably the best asset of the international community
with regard to the resolution of the Ivorian conflict, and could be the most effective
mediator. Unlike France, the US does not have a history of colonial involvement in
Cote d'Ivoire and in Africa. All the Ivorian parties have stated that they view and
trust the US as a truly neutral third party and have called for its involvement in the
resolution of this conflict. On one hand, through the "young patriots"' sit-in at the
US Embassy in Abidjan, Mr. Gbagbo's visit to Washington, and Mrs. Gbagbo's
lobbying of US conservative organizations, the presidential camp has tried to secure
the support of the US government by arguing that their enemies are terrorists with
ties to Muslim fundamentalist groups. On the other hand, the new alliance formed
Peace and Conflict Studies• Volume 12, Number 2
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by the political opposition parties and the Forces Nouvelles has found considerable
encouragement in the official position of the US government (stated clearly and
consistently by its representatives in CI since 1995) which calls for the organization
of free, fair and inclusive elections; the adoption of democratic governing
institutions and processes; and the protection of civil liberties and human rights.
The European Union is another legitimate and potentially effective
mediator because it is both an important provider of financial aid and a strong
supporter of democratic reforms in Cote d'Ivoire. EU involvement would in some
way "dilute" the negative perceptions associated with the position of France as a
self-interested party to the conflict. Moreover, it could lead to that of truly
neutral/impartial countries (such as Norway) with a clear record of support to
peaceful conflict resolution efforts throughout the world.
Finally, South Africa is a considerably legitimate and potentially successful
mediator if it is willing and able to work with other (non-West) African states to
support the new UN peacekeeping and conflict resolution strategy.

The 2005 elections must be postponed
The postponement of the constitutionally mandated Ivorian elections of
2005 is no longer a matter of choice but rather an imperative necessity. It can be
justified by on strategic, political, psychological and administrative/technical
grounds.
First, it is noteworthy that the Ivorian parties failed to implement the LM
roadmap in large part because once it became clear that the 2005 elections would be
the major terminal event of the roadmap process, the strategists and political parties
on both sides chose to focus on the preparation of these elections. This in tum
contributed to a significant heightening of tensions as the presidential side sought to
secure a political advantage (and/or the opposition parties and the FN naturally
accused it of trying to do so) by controlling the main ministries in charge of the
country's financial assets and/or major economic sectors and infrastructures, the
state-controlled media, and the supposedly independent national electoral
commission; by terrorizing opposition leaders and militants through targeted
executions, mass murders and other forms of persecution; and even by making
militarily preparations to defeat and destroy the FN (hence the planning and
execution of the military operations which resulted in the escalation of 4-7
November 2004).
Second, as a result of these contentious moves and countermoves, tensions
are still so high on both sides and are certainly likely to get worse as we get closer
to the scheduled dates. 13 In this context, organizing presidential and other elections
in a country that is still partitioned in two would amount to authorizing the
continuation of the war in (and around) the ballot box and would encourage the
proliferation of violent episodes throughout the country. In fact, given that each
zone will likely remain under the control of sometimes overzealous armed
combatants and that each party tends to dehumanize the other side, it would be
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absolutely impossible to guarantee the security of the leaders and supporters of each
party, let alone their right and ability to conduct meaningful campaign activities, in
the zone controlled by the other party.
Finally, after more than two years of administrative and financial
precariousness, the administrative infrastructure of the country and particularly its
technical ability to organize credible elections has been considerably disrupted, if
not totally destroyed. It would take much more than the 11 months remaining before
October 2005 to repair and restore that capability.
In the context described above, a decision to subject the belligerent parties,
the lvorian people and the international peacemakers to the strategic, political and
psychological pressures associated with the preparation and organization of the
2005 elections would only jeopardize the success of the new peacekeeping and
conflict resolution process proposed here.
However, the decision to postpone the constitutionally mandated elections
can, must and should be taken only as an integral part of a realistic peacekeeping
and conflict resolution agenda implemented by the UN in ways that take into
account the best interests of the country. The new peacekeeping and conflict
resolution strategy for Cote d'Ivoire should be built on the key principles, and
composed of the major steps listed in the following sections.
Key principles of the proposed intervention strategy

Principle# 1: Institute a clear and comprehensive UN mandate
The new peacekeeping and conflict resolution plan for Cote d'Ivoire must
be part of on a clear and comprehensive UN mandate. In order to ensure full success
in the implementation of this plan, the country should be placed under the direct
political and administrative authority of the United Nations. The plan must be
implemented, to the fullest possible extent, by genuinely impartial international
actors, including states, intergovernmental institutions, non-governmental
organizations, as well as individual members of the international civil society.
Principle # 2: Impose disarmament as a pre-requisite for UN intervention
Disarmament of all the parties must be made a prerequisite for the
implementation of the new plan. This principle can be successfully imposed to the
lvorian parties if the UN moves quickly enough to take advantage of the new
situation of forces on the ground created by the events of 4-7 November 2004 and
also of the favorable political climate which follows the adoption of resolution
1572. 14
The leadership of the UN and French forces should negotiate with the FN
leadership to start an immediate voluntary disarmament operation followed by joint
security patrols in the zone under their control. Such a move would effectively
ensure that weapons and military operations can no longer be a factor in the
evolution and resolution of the conflict, and also that the political solutions that are
required will be negotiated in a fair and sensible manner.
Principle# 3: Recognize the needs and interests of all the Non-Ivorian
parties
Peace and _Conflict Studies • Volume 12, Number 2
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It is critically important for the peacemaking organizations to identify all
the non-Ivorian parties to the conflict; to enable them to clearly express their own
needs and interests in (as well as expectations for) the current and future political
economy of Cote d'Ivoire and of West Africa; and to take these interests and
expectations into account in their conflict resolution efforts in the short, mid and
long terms. Considerable weight should be given to the fact that the Ivorian parties
have accused the governments of France and that of some West African states of
providing military assistance to the enemy.
Principle # 4: Reform the national electoral calendar
The constitutionally mandated elections of 2005 must be postponed because
organization of these elections as prescribed by the LM roadmap is not realistically
feasible under the current political, psychological and administrative/technical
conditions prevailing in the country.
The implementation of a new conflict resolution plan presents a unique
opportunity for making the necessary adjustments to the national electoral calendar,
which was disturbed significantly in 2000-2002, by holding all the elections in the
same year. It also provides the opportunity to reform the whole electoral system by
holding all these election on the same date (a single ballot enables the voters to
chose the candidates to all existing elected positions, which is similar to the current
US system and is less costly for the national budget) or by reversing the order in
which the elections are held (municipal first, then departmental, parliamentary,
presidential in that order).
The best time period for holding these elections appears to be between 7
July 2007, when the term of the existing elected "Conseils Generaux de
Departements et de Districts" expires, and 1 January 2008 (the beginning of a new
year).
The 3-year transitional period should be used to defuse the psychological
pressure associated with such highly contested political competitions; set up
effective security conditions and systems in order to guarantee the protection of all
the voters and candidates; and restore the national identification and electoral
registration system, which is the only way to ensure that the next series of elections
are truly inclusive, free, and fair.
Principle # 5: Empower existing institutions with high democratic
legitimacy
The new plan must be based on a solid and thorough knowledge of the
constitutional, political and public policy making institutions of the Ivorian state. It
must give careful consideration to and, whenever possible, empower existing local
governing institutions that have achieved and continue to retain a significant
measure of democratic legitimacy. A comparative assessment of the major Ivorian
institutions reveals that the existing local governments (Conseils Generaux de
Departements/Districts and Conseils Municipaux) are the best candidates for the
more prominent roles mentioned above.
As instruments of local participative governance, these councils are the
most credible national partners for the implementation of the new conflict resolution
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plan because they enjoy a high level of democratic legitimacy. The election of the
municipal councils on 25 March 2001 and of the departmental and district councils
on 7 July 2002 was considered absolutely free and fair by all the political parties.
The legal mission of these councils is to exercise direct executive authority and
public service duties for the welfare of the local populations. Finally, they are
entitled by law to receive and exercise a share of the nation's political and
administrative authority as well as a share of its fiscal resources in order to achieve
these ends.
Major steps of the new intervention strategy
Step# 1
The UNSC adopts a resolution which places Cote d'Ivoire under the direct
political and administrative authority of the UN for the duration of the period of
time (3 years from today) required to complete the new peacekeeping and conflict
resolution plan.
The resolution should preferably be authored by the United States and
ideally co-signed by a majority of SC members, including any sitting European
Union and/or African states. It should be adopted and announced as soon as possible
in order to relieve the tensions due to the uncertainties of the current situation on the
ground, optimally before the effective date for implementation of individual
sanctions (15 December 2004) and certainly before the deadline set for the adoption
of another SC resolution which could nullify resolution 1572 ( 15 January 2005).
The UN provisional administrator and his entire staff should be appointed
and the major steps of the new roadmap should be made public within a month from
the adoption of the resolution. The new multinational peacekeeping force to replace
the French troops should be on the ground within the next three months. The new
roadmap would include the list of the other major steps and initiatives proposed
below. The UN provisional administrator should announce the major steps and
initiatives of the new roadmap as soon as possible after his nomination.
Step #2
The multilateral peacekeeping force begins implementation of a
program/schedule of concrete actions toward general and complete disarmament of
all the lvorian parties under a strict UN peace-enforcement mechanism. The
program may include the following actions:
Immediate disarmament and demobilization of all the combatants
This mission could be initially entrusted to the French and UN
peacekeeping troops currently on the ground. However, in order to guarantee the
political legitimacy of the program for all the parties in the long term, it is suggested
that the French troops be replaced as soon as possible by a truly impartial
multinational UN peace-enforcement force. Such a force could include very
symbolic numbers of troops (< or = 20) from the US, the UK, Russia and China
(why not?); Canada, EU countries other than France, and other European countries;
as well as significantly larger numbers of troops from African countries, if possible
with an important contingent of South African troops.
Only such a coalition of truly impartial forces will be considered legitimate
by most lvorians and Africans. Ideally, there would be a visible involvement of the
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US government in this endeavor, possibly in the form of a US commander for the
multilateral force. This would be particularly helpful in securing the compliance of
all the parties (lvorian and non-lvorian). At the same time, it would send a message
to the world community that the US truly cares about peaceful conflict resolution in
international affairs and that it is willing and able to work with other world powers
to promote freedom and democracy in "poor" nations as well as in "oil rich" ones.
Creation and training of a National Republican Army
Decisive steps should be taken toward the creation of a National Republican
Army and the provision of professional training for the national security forces
(including the police and the gendarmerie ), immediately following the completion
of the disarmament program.
Naturally, a set of financial arrangements should be made to guarantee the
availability of the financial resources required for the successful implementation of
this program. These arrangements should be largely publicized as a way to further
induce the parties to comply.
Step #3
The UN and the Ivorian parties begin implementation of the schedule of
concrete measures and actions contained in the new plan.
The measures and actions outlined below are those considered as required
fo establish legitimate governing institutions to run the country during the transition
period; provide the country with a new constitution and democratic institutions,
which it needs in order to set the appropriate legal and political framework for
achieving genuine national reconciliation following the reunification of the country;
and facilitate the successful re-integration of the new Cote d'Ivoire in the West
African region. The program may include the following initiatives:
International Conference on Cote d'Ivoire
An "International Conference for peace and security in Cote d'Ivoire and
the WA region" should be convened by the UNSG at the request of the SC. The
initiative for the conference could be taken by the United States and supported by
all the members of the Council. Beside the UN and the major impartial international
actors, the list of invited participants to the conference should include: the lvorian
parties, France, the 15 West African states, all concerned African intergovernmental
organizations, as well as every national, local and international non-governmental
organization with a genuine and actual interest in the political and socioeconomic
development of CI and the West African region.
The conference should serve as a forum for an open, inclusive and
informative discussion about the specific interests of each participant, as well as the
ways and means to accommodate these interests through the proposed solutions to
the current conflict. The conference should also examine the opportunities and/or
challenges suggested by this conflict for the political integration of the 16 WA
states in the foreseeable future, through a set of federal and/or con~federal
arrangements. 15
Finally, the conclusions and resolutions of the conference should be widely
disseminated in CI as a way to inform the framers of the new lvorian constitution as
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to the expectations of the international community in terms of desired rules for the
Ivorian economic and political system.
Mention of this conference and its objectives among the major steps of the
new roadmap should contribute to creating the positive climate which could
significantly enhance the acceptability of the new plan by the parties and by the
international public opinion.
Step #4
The Ivorian parties begin implementation of the schedule of concrete
measures and actions contained in the new plan. The schedule distinguishes the
period between December 2004 and October 2005 and the period from October
2005 to July 2007.
The period from December 2004 to October 2005
Executive branch
The existing National Reconciliation Government could be dissolved, not
only because it is ineffective but also because it's very existence and its current
operating dynamics are factor of division and polarization under the current
conditions. President Gbagbo should subsequently be authorized to appoint a new
Prime Minister and form a "loyalist government" which would run the part of the
ccuntry under his control until the end of his term in 2005. Similarly, the leadership
of the FN should be authorized to form a civilian transitional authority (or a
"government" with a Prime Minister and a cabinet if they so desire) to oversee the
provision of public services to the local population in the portion of the country
under their control. 16
A National Executive Coordination Committee should be formed, if both
parties agree, with or all or part of the members of the two "governments". It would
serve as an intergovernmental coordination body and could meet once a month in
Abidjan, Yamoussoukro or Bourke in order to discuss standing or emerging issues
relating to the implementation of the new UN roadmap until and after 2005, and
also to the reunification of the country after 2007.
In addition to these institutions, a National Consultative Commission of
Elected Local Leaders could be formed to discuss all issues related to the
management of national public services and make recommendation to the
government(s). The NCELL would be composed of the Presidents of the 58
"Conseils generaux de departments et de districts" and the 138 municipal councils
whose electoral terms will end in 2007 for the former and in 2005 for the latter. It
could meet once a month (or on an ad hoc basis) in Abidjan, Yamoussoukro or
Bouake, to discuss standing or emerging issues relating to the implementation of the
new UN roadmap until and after 2005 and also to the reunification of the country
after 2007.
An alternative to the main proposal regarding the formation of two separate
and distinct governments presented above would be for the current President to
form a new national government with a Prime Minister and Cabinet members who
will be selected exclusively among the 58 Presidents of the "Conseils generaux de
Departements et de districts" and the Mayors of the 138 municipal councils
mentioned above.
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Legislative branch
The Parliament would continue to make legislation for the whole country as
long as it is possible to ensure the right of free circulation and the security of all its
members everywhere in the country.
Other institutions
The Supreme Court and the Constitutional Council would continue to
exercise their normal jurisdictional duties.
The Economic and Social Council is another forum where issues relating to
the consequences of the conflict, as well as major steps to reunification of the
country and national reconciliation can be discussed.
The FANCI and the Forces Nouvelles would conduct their security and law
enforcement activities in their respective zones, but in close collaboration with the
UN peace-keeping forces . Their respective leadership should continue to collaborate
on resolving all issues relating to the integration of both forces into a National
Republican Army, and to the training and equipment of that unified army, as well as
its mission in a reunified country before or after 2007.
The National Electoral Commission could be mandated to reflect on past,
current and future problems and issues concerning the preparation and organization
of national elections. It should be especially mandated to conduct a detailed,
comprehensive assessment of its technical and operational capabilities for
organizing the 2007 elections in a free, fair, transparent, efficient and effective
manner.
The period from October 2005 to July 2007
Election of a National Legislative and Constitutive Assembly
A nationwide election should be held to select the members of a National
Legislative and Constitutive Assembly composed of 225 representatives (just like
the current parliament). The election should take place as soon as technically
possible (the next day?) after the expiration of the current Presidential term (22
October 2005?).
It should be made clear that the candidates (and future representatives) will
officially not represent political parties but their own "portion" of the national
territory. This prescription does not require banning all political parties, or even
forbidding any form of contribution from these parties to the _individual campaigns.
It only requires the inclusion in the rules regulating that specific election that all
mentions or indications of the candidate's party affiliation in his official campaign
documents and statements, or in the general conduct of his campaign are prohibited.
It also requires provisions indicating that parliamentary caucus groups based on
party affiliation are prohibited in the operation and proceedings of the NLCA.
The mandate of the NLCA should include the following missions:
(i) Elect the new Ivorian PR and PM of the national transitional government
and confirm the appointment by these officials of the members of their cabinet;
(ii) Exercise the normal functions and duties of the lvorian National
Assembly, but with the clear provision that there will be no official role and status
for parliamentary caucus groups based on members' political party affiliation;
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(iii) Elaborate a new constitution and national electoral code for the new
Republic of Cote d 'lvoire. The constitution and electoral code will be submitted to a
national referendum for its definitive adoption in July-August 2007;
(iv) Exercise full and close legislative review and oversight authority for the
adoption and implementation of the policies of the NTG relating to process toward
normal constitutional legality as well as to national unity and national
reconciliation;
(v) Confirm/approve the nomination of judges to the Supreme Court and of
the members of the Constitutional Council;
(vi) Approve the nomination ofrepresentatives of the central government to
the National Electoral Commission.
Designation of a new President, Prime Minister and Cabinet
At its first meeting, the NLCA elects the new President of the Republic and
the new Prime Minister on a two-candidate list, among its members. It then elects
its own president and officials (bureau), and forms its working committees.
The new President appoints 20 members from the NLCA to form the
National Transitional Government. Each of these appointments (and any subsequent
changes in the composition of the NTG) must be approved or confirmed by the
NLCA at its next meeting.
The mandates of the PR, the PM and the members of the NLCA expire at
the end of the transitional period in July 2007. The PR and the PM of the NTG
cannot run in the Presidential elections immediately following the expiration of
their term and that of the NLCA.

Other institutions
The missions of the Supreme Court/Constitutional Council, the Economic
and Social Council, the FANCI and the F AFN, and the National Electoral
Commission would remain the same as those outlined in the sections relating to the
period between now and 2005.
Step# 5
Organization of the national referendum required to adopt the new draft
constitution and/or electoral code/law submitted to the lvorian people by the NLCA.
Step# 6
Organization of inclusive, free and fair elections for the designation of the
new president, representatives to the National Assembly, members of the
"department" and district councils, as well as members of the municipal councils.
Such elections would be conducted in conformity with the new constitution and
electoral laws approved by the Ivorian voters through the democratic procedures
outlined in this proposal.
Conclusion
The lvorian civil war is as much a consequence as it is the cause of
conflicting meanings of resistance. The nationalist/anti-colonialist resistance
rhetoric used by the presidential party and regime raises several important questions
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about the nature of the country's past, current and future relations with France, the
former colonial power. The rebel groups' claim to represent the resistance of
Northern and Muslim populations against the ethnic and religious exclusionism
embodied in the politics and policies of "Ivoirite" underscores the urgency to
address the nature of the country's relations with several of its Western African
neighbors, whose natives have migrated to and lived in Cote d'Ivoire for many
generations. Finally, the political opposition's claim to represent a civil-democratic
resistance against a despotic and sectarian government highlights the need to
address the problems related to political, socioeconomic and individual rights that
were left unresolved under the PDCI regimes of 1960-1993 and 1993-1999.
The new conflict resolution and peace-building strategy presented above is
based on the belief that these are fundamental, constitutive, issues that can be best
resolved through appropriate constitutional processes and dispositions, as the
Ivorian people and its leaders clearly understood after General Robert Guei's
"bloodless Coup" of December 1999. In this sense, this civil war is a predictable
consequence of the failure by the political transition which followed to endow the
country with the truly democratic constitution that it's various social components
needed and requested. Therefore, the proper role of the international community in
resolving this conflict cannot be simply to help designate a new president (which is
the main purpose of the elections envisioned in the LM roadmap), but rather to
guide and assist the Ivorian people in its attempts to give birth to a new, democratic
Ivorian state. 17
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Endnote
Linstroth, personal communication.
The current members of the PSC are Algeria, Cameroon, Republic ofC~ngo, Ethiopia,
Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Libya, Mozambique, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Sudan
and Togo. The one-day summit meeting was widened to include ECOW AS leaders who are
not PSC members.
2

The Council also announced additional measures required to expedite the implementation
of the agreement, namely: (i) establishment of an International Working Group (IWG -composed of ministerial level representatives of (Benin, Ghana, Guinea, Niger, Nigeria,
South Africa, France, the United Kingdom, the United States, the United Nations, the
African Union, the European Union, ECOWAS, the Organisation Internationale de la
Francophonie, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund) which will meet once a
month in Cote D'Ivoire to evaluate, monitor and follow up on the peace process; and (ii)
organization of a Forum of National Dialogue (co-chaired by Presidents Olusegun Obasanjo
ofNigeria and Thabo Mbeki of South Africa) which will be attended by Ivorian parties as
well as traditional rulers and representatives of the civil society and the private sector.
3

UN Integrated Regional Information Networks. "Cote d'Ivoire: African Leaders Want
Gbagbo in the Helm Another Year to Avert Constitutional Crisis."
http://allafrica.com/stories.html, October 7, 2005.
According to this view, the main cause of the conflict is the failure of President Gbagbo's
FPI regime to satisfy the political interests and aspirations of specific components of the
national community. This thesis was "sold" to the international community in large part by
French media organizations restating the official position of the French government.

4

The 15 WA states countries most likely to be self-interested external parties to the current
conflict include, listed here in decreasing order of "attachment" to Cl: Burkina Faso, Mali,
Guinea, Liberia, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Senegal, Gambia, Togo, Benin, Niger, Nigeria,
Mauritania, Cape-Verde and Guinea-Bissau.
5
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Judging only by the number of emergency repatriation operations conducted by the French
government in CI since December 1999, it can be argued that, with 20,000 French citizens

6
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residing in Cote d'Ivoire, France has the same incentives to act covertly as a self-interested
party in the Ivorian conflict than Burkina Faso with its 2,000,000 citizens in the same
situation. In fact, one of the main principles of France's West African policy (as laid out by
successive French Presidents) is that Cote d'Ivoire is and must remain the exclusive preserve
of France ("La Cote d'Ivoire est et doit demeurer la chasse gardee de la France.").
- u nder th ;:
--go\'emmen:s-

See for instance, Mamadou Coulibaly, La Guerre de la France a la Cote d'Ivoire (France's
War Against Cote d'Ivoire). Imprimerie Nationale de Cote d'Ivoire, 2003.

uni ty .. and 7.

The Wade plan has already been submitted to the French and US presidents, and to AU
leaders. It seeks to institute a transitional period of 3 to 5 years during which a transitional
government composed of "technocrats" supposedly "independent from political parties"
would be mandated to rebuild Cl's economy. President Gbagbo and the parliament would
remain in place until the expiration of their electoral term in 2005.
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7

8

This assertion is based on this analyst's own observation of constitution writing/adoption
process.

9

"Cette resolution est pour nous injuste, a aucun moment la Cote d'Ivoire n'a ete entendue,
et comme le disait Jean de la Fontaine, la raison du plus fort est toujours la meilleure ... Tout
a ete fait sur la base de la presentation faite par la France, alors qu'elle est partie prenante au
conflit." RFI ( 11/16/04). http://www.rfi.fr.actufr/articles/059/article_ 31790.asp
10

"Le President Gbagbo: C'est un scandale que les forces frarn;:aises soient impartiales." In
Notre Voie, 11/21/04.
11

12 That is, of course, assuming that no actions of the kind proposed here is taken by the UN
and the parties are left with no alternative to the existing roadmap.

The presidential side seems resigned to accept the fact that, as a result of the actions taken
by the French military forces since November 7, 2004 and also of the arms embargo
imposed by resolution 1572, it does not have and cannot reconstitute the military resources
that would be required to defeat the FN. The obligation to disarm this party should be
extended to all its paramilitary and civilian forces. The process should also focus on finding
weapons caches that could be created with the intent of arming civilian militia several
months or years after the official end of the disarmament process. The Forces Nouvelles
seemed unwilling to resume military operations, even when their positions were bombed by
the FANCI on November 4-6. They have often shown a willingness to disarm if given
appropriate guarantees regarding the end of hostilities and the protection of their combatants
and the populations in the zones under their control: first, they convinced the loyalist army
to negotiate an official end to the hostilities in (June-July 2004. Second, following the
attacks on BCEAO headquarters the rebel leaders authorized the French troops to move into
their zone in order to help protect civilian populations and financial institutions.
13

In this regard, the Ivorian conflict seems to provide an opportunity for the French West
African states to revisit the question posed by the French colonial government in 1958,
namely whether the colonies should be granted independence as individual nation-states or
rather as members of a federation of states to be created. It would be interesting to see
whether the current leaders of these states are willing and/or able to admit, almost 50 years
14
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and 2 generations later, that the initial choice to go separately to independence was a historic
mistake. Another challenge from this situation is to see how the Anglophone countries who
are part of the region position themselves vis-a-vis the suggested federal and/or con-federal
arrangements.
14 Under the current "military" and political circumstances, the coexistence of two
"governments" in the same country is not compatible with the requirements of "national
unity" and "territorial integrity". Such a temporary arrangement acknowledges the division
of CI in two distinct portions controlled by two different "armies". However, it has the
added merit of creating a political climate which will enable progress toward the
reunification of the national territory in due time. This is clearly a "lesser evil" than the
alternative policy which, because it is based on a denial of the real situation on the ground,
may lead to contentious incidents which could delay the much desired reunification and
even risk rendering the division of the country permanent.

It is noteworthy that the constitution of August 2000 is known as the constitution of the 2nd
Ivorian Republic because, in the French republican tradition, a major political crisis may
lead to the termination of an existing republic/constitution and the creation of a new one.
Thus, to the extent that the military Coup of 1999 lead to the creation of the 2nd republic, it
would be logical to think that that the civil war which started in 2002 can only end with the
creation of the 3rd lvorian Republic.
15

16 Under the current "military" and political circumstances, the coexistence of two
"governments" in the same country is not compatible with the requirements of "national
unity" and "territorial integrity". Such a temporary arrangement acknowledges the division
of CI in two distinct portions controlled by two different "armies". However, it has the
added merit of creating a political climate which will enable progress toward the
reunification of the national territory in due time. This is clearly a "lesser evil" than the
alternative policy which, because it is based on a denial of the real situation on the ground,
may lead to contentious incidents which could delay the much desired reunification and
even risk rendering the division of the country permanent.

17 It is noteworthy that the constitution of August 2000 is known as the constitution of the
2 nd Ivorian Republic because, in the French republican tradition, a major political crisis may
lead to the termination of an existing republic/constitution and the creation of a new one.
Thus, to the extent that the military Coup of 1999 lead to the creation of the 2nd republic, it
would be logical to think that that the civil war which started in 2002 can only end with the
creation of the 3rd lvorian Republic.

,r the French West
ernment in 1958,
ual nation-states or
: interesting to see
Lit, almost 50 years

Peace and Conflict Studies• Volume 12, Number 2

- 128 -

